UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-26-2013

Myers v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40259

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Myers v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40259" (2013). Not Reported. 1058.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1058

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAH :J
DAVID BARTON MYERS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

COPY

No.40259
Canyon Co. Case No.
CV-2011-11732

)

_____________ )
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON

HONORABLE SUSAN E. WIEBE
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

DAVID B. MYERS
IDOC #14793
ISCI
PO Box 14
Boise, 83707

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

PROSE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 3

Myers Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's
Factual Findings, And Therefore Has Shown No Error In
The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief..................................................................................................... 3
A.

Introduction ................................................................................ 3

B.

Standard of Review .................................................................... 5

C.

Because The Suppression Motion Would Have Been
Denied Regardless, Myers Failed To Prove Any Prejudice
From The Failure To File A Timely Suppression Motion ............ 5

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ........................................................................... 8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,760 P.2d 1174 (1988) ........................................ 5
Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 452 P.2d 54 (1969) ................................................. 5
Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,978 P.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1999) ........................... 5
Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 775 P.2d 1243 (Ct. App. 1989) ............................. 6
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 725 P.2d 135 (1986) ............................................ 5
Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 857 P.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1993) ............................... 6
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 828 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App. 1992) .......................... 5
Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982) ............................................ 5
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 792 P.2d 964 (Ct. App. 1990) .......................... 5
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ................................................ 6
State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 963 P.2d 387 (Ct. App. 1998) ............................ 6
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989) ....................................... 5
State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986) ...................................... 6
State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 978 P.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1999) ............................. 6
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 26 P.3d 31 (2001) ................................................. 6

RULES
I.C.R. 57(c) ............................................................................................................ 5

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David B. Myers appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief after an evidentiary hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Myers pied guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. (R., p. 103.) He
filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting several claims, including a claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to suppress
evidence. (R., pp. 3-10.) The district court granted his motion for appointment of
counsel, and appointed counsel filed an amended petition. (R., pp. 11-14, 20-21,
38-45.)

The matter proceeded to evidentiary hearing.

(R., pp. 80-82.)

The

district court denied the petition, concluding that a timely-filed motion for
suppression would have been denied on the merits.
filed a timely notice of appeal.

(R., pp. 114-16.)

(R., pp. 103-12.) Myers
Although the district court

appointed counsel to represent Myers on appeal (R., p. 119), appellate counsel's
motion to withdraw was granted (Motion for Leave to Withdraw (filed on or about
2/13/13); Order Granting Motion for Leave to Withdraw (entered 3/11/13)).
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ISSUE
Has Myers failed to demonstrate error in the district court's determination
that his counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a timely motion to suppress
because such a motion would not have been granted?
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ARGUMENT
Myers Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Factual Findings, And
Therefore Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that the following factual findings would have

been made upon Myers' motion for suppression of evidence:
On January 21, 2010 Caldwell Police Officer Brockbank made a
routine traffic stop and spoke to a woman he identified as "Komp."
Komp provided information to Brockbank about criminal activity at
201 ½ Blaine Street in Caldwell. Komp said she drove from
Payette to that residence just a few minutes before being stopped
by Brockbank, and dropped off two men at the residence. The two
men told Komp they [were] going there to see "Dave" about trading
some appliances for drugs.
Additionally, a month earlier,
Brockbank received information from other detectives that the same
residence was being used for "fencing" stolen property. Brockbank
had also checked a license plate of a car parked at the residence
and found that it was registered to a woman with an outstanding
felony warrant who was in fact later located on the property after
Petitioner was arrested.
Brockbank, along with Officer Hoadley, went to the
residence to investigate. The property had a home, and in the back
yard there was a camp trailer. They first approached the trailer and
knocked on the door. Petitioner opened the door. Brockbank told
Petitioner that he was there to investigate possible criminal activity
and asked if they could come in and talk about it. At that point,
Petitioner stepped back and made a gesture with his arm allowing
Brockbank into the trailer. The Court notes that Petitioner has at
times denied this, but the Court finds that Petitioner's account is not
credible. Petitioner's attorney concedes that Brockbank's initial
entry was consensual.
Next, Brockbank asked Petitioner for identification and
Petitioner removed his wallet and handed his identification to
Brockbank, who then stepped out to radio the information to
dispatch for a records check. The Court notes that Petitioner does
not raise the issue of whether this was a reasonable investigative
detention. When Brockbank stepped out, Officer Hoadley stepped
into the threshold of the trailer to keep an eye on Petitioner.
3

Hoadley asked for permission to search the trailer, and Petitioner
unequivocally refused, stating he knew his rights and did not have
to let them search. Petitioner never at any time asked or told either
officer to step out of the trailer or leave his property. Hoadley then
made small talk with Petitioner while waiting for Brockbank to finish
his discussion with dispatch. Hoadley had previous contacts with
Petitioner and believed him to be a convicted felon. Hoadley noted
that the interior of the trailer was cluttered with items and there was
a small area in the back of the trailer behind a corner and some
boxes that he could not see into, but appeared to be large enough
to hide an individual. Hoadley asked if there was anyone else in
the trailer and Petitioner said no. Hoadley asked if he could just
walk to the back of the trailer to make sure no one was hiding there.
At that point, although the evidence is conflicting, the Court finds
that Petitioner affirmatively nodded to Hoadley, Petitioner stepped
aside to allow Hoadley access, and Petitioner asked Hoadley to not
scare the cat.

When Hoadley went to the back of the trailer, he saw a
shotgun shell and the handgun in plain view. Shortly thereafter,
[the officers] confirmed that Petitioner was a convicted felon who
was prohibited from possessing handguns and arrested him for that
crime.
(R., pp. 107-08.)

Based on these facts, the district court concluded that

"Petitioner gave voluntary consent" to Officer Hoadley to enter the trailer to
confirm there were no other persons present. (R., p. 111.) Because Myers gave
voluntary consent, the "motion to suppress would have been denied." (Id.) On
this basis, the district court rejected Myers' claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
On appeal Myers claims, but has failed to show, error by the district court.
(Appellant's brief.)
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B.

Standard of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based.
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A
trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled
to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct.
App. 1990). Further, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to
the testimony are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rueth v. State,
103 Idaho 74,644 P.2d 1333 (1982).

C.

Because The Suppression Motion Would Have Been Denied Regardless,
Myers Failed To Prove Any Preiudice From The Failure To File A Timely
Suppression Motion
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135,141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). A petitioner seeking relief
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must prove "that his counsel was
deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice."
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,776 P.2d 424 (1989)).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App.
5

1999). Where, as here, the allegedly deficient performance was failure to file a
suppression motion, the petitioner has failed to prove prejudice if the motion
would not have been granted. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634,
637 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 407, 775 P.2d 1243, 1249
(Ct. App. 1989).
The district court's conclusion that the suppression motion would not have
been granted was correct. Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement
and justifies entry into a home. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d
1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct.
App. 1999); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App.
1998). Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,
852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a
question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.
~

at 848, 852, 26 P.3d at 35; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S.

218, 225-226 (1973)).

The district court's factual finding that Myers gave

voluntary consent for Detective Hoadley to enter the home is dispositive of
Myers' ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it disproves the prejudice
element of that claim.
On appeal Myers asserts he in fact did not give voluntary consent.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 2-3.) He has failed, however, to articulate or demonstrate
how the evidence before the district court, once the trial court resolved conflicts
in the evidence on the basis of credibility of the witnesses, did not support the
district court's factual findings. Myers also argues that officers lacked probable
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or other legal cause to enter the trailer to conduct a protective sweep.
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) However, because the district court concluded that the
suppression motion would have been denied based on application of the consent
exception, application of the protective sweep exception is rendered moot.
Myers failed to show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure
to timely bring the suppression motion that the outcome of his criminal case
would have been any different. The district court therefore properly denied his
petition for post-conviction relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
and judgment denying Myers' petition for post-conviction relief.

DATED this 26th day of August, 2013.

ETH K. JORG
Deputy Attorney Ge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of August, 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DAVID B. MYERS
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